The Hitler-Bormann Documents

The Hitler-Bormann Documents

February-April 1945


10th February 1945

I have sometimes asked myself whether we were not wrong, in 1940, not to have drawn Spain into the war It would have been too easy for words to do so, for Spam was burning to follow Italy's example and become a member of the Victors' Club.

 But as Spain had really nothing tangible to contribute, I came to the conclusion that her direct intervention was not desirable. It is true that it would have allowed us to occupy Gibraltar. On the other hand, Spain^s entry into the war would certainly have added many kilo- metres to the Atlantic coast-lme which we would have had to defend— from Saint Sebastian to Cadiz. Then there was the further possibility of a renewal of the civil war, fanned by the British.

To sum up, by ensuring that the Iberian peninsula remained neutral Spain has already rendered us the one service in this conflict which she had in her power to render. Having Italy on our backs is a sufficient burden in all conscience; and whatever may be the qualities of the Spanish soldier, Spain herself, in her state of poverty and unpreparedness, would have been a heavy liability rather than an asset.

The easiest thing would have been to occupy Gibraltar with our Commandos and with Franco's connivance, but without any declaration of war on his part. I am convinced that Britain would not have seized this as a pretext for declaring war on Spain. She would have been only too pleased to see Spain continue to remain non-belligerent. And from our own point of view, this would have eliminated all danger of any British landing on the coasts of Portugal.


14th February 1945

 From the purely miUtary point of view, it would have suited us better if it had started sooner. I ought to have se-ized the initiative in 1938 instead of allowing myself to be forced into war in 1939; for war was, in any case, unavoidable. However, you can hardly blame me if the British and the French accepted at Munich every demand I made of them!

Our greatest political blunder has been our treatment of the French. We should never have collaborated with them. It is a policy which has stood them in . good stead and has served us ill. Abetz thought he was being ver> clever when he became the champion of this idea and persuaded us to pursue it. He thought he was two moves ahead of events, whereas in reality he was well behind them. He seemed to think that we were dealing wdth the France of Napoleon, with a nation, that is, which was capable of appreciating the importance and far-reaching effects of a noble gesture. He failed to see what is an obvious fact, namely, that during the last hundred years France has changed completely. She has become a prostitute, and she is now a raddled old strumpet, who has never ceased to swindle and to confound us, and has always left us to foot the bill.

Our obvious course should have been to liberate the working classes and to help the workers of France to implement their own revolution. We should have brushed aside, rudely and without pity, the fossilized bourgeoisie, as devoid of soul as it is denuded of patriotism.

We were equally stupid as regards the French colonies.
Never, at any price, should we have put our money on France and against the peoples subjected to her yoke. On the contrary, we should have helped them to achieve their liberty and, if necessary, should have goaded them into doing so. There was nothing to stop us in 1940 from making a gesture of this sort in the Near East and in North Africa. In actual fact our diplomats instead set about the task of consolidating French power, not only in Syria, but in Tunis, in Algeria and Morocco as well. Our 'gentlemen' obviously preferred to maintain cordial relations with distinguished Frenchmen, rather than with a lot of hirsute revolutionaries, with a chorus of musical comedy officers, whose one idea was to cheat us, rather than with the Arabs, who would have been loyal partners for us. Oh! you needn't think I don't see through the calculations of these Machiavellian professionals! They know their job and they have their traditions ! All they thought about was the dirty trick they were playing on the British, for they were still under the ban of the famous alleged antagonism and rivalry between Britain and France in the colonial field. What I'm saying is perfectly true — they are still living in the reign of Wilhelm II, in the world of Queen Victoria and that of those artful sharpers named Poincare and Delcasse! In actual fact this rivalry has ceased to be of any significance. That it still seems to exist is due lu the fact that there are still some diplomats of the old school in the ranks of our adversaries too. In reality, Britain and France are associates, each of whom is playing his own game with considerable asperity, neither of whom react to any appeal to friendship, but both of whom unite again against a common danger. The Frenchman's deep-seated hatred of the German is something deeper and different. Therein lies a lesson on which we should do well to ponder in the future.

As regards France, there were two courses open to her. Either she could have abandoned her alliance with Britain, in which case she would have been of no interest to us as a potential ally, since we knew that she would also abandon us on the first opportunity; or she could have pretended to make this change of partners, in which case she would have been of even more dubious value to us. On our side, some of the wishful thinking about this country was quite ridiculous. In reahty there was only one possible policy to adopt vis-a-vis France^a policy of rigorous and rigid distrust. I know I was right about France, With prophetic foresight I gave an accurate picture of France in Mein Kampf, And I know perfectly well why, in spite of all the representations that have been made to me, I have seen no reason at all to change fhe opinions I formed twenty years ago.


15th February 1945

No decision which I have had to make during the course of this war was graver than that to attack Russia. I had always maintained that we ought at all costs to avoid waging war on two fronts, and you may rest assured that I pondered long and anxiously over Napoleon and his experiences in Russia. Why, then, you may ask, this war against Russia, and why at the time that I selected?

We had already given up hope of ending the war by means of a successful invasion of Britain. Furthermore that country, under the guidance of its stupid chiefs, would have refused to recognize the hegemony we had set up in Europe as long as there remained on the Continent a Great Power which was fundamentally hostile to the Third Reich. The war, then, would have gone on and on, a war in which, behind the British, the Americans would have played an increasingly active role. The importance of the war potential of the United States, the progress made in armaments — both in our own camp and in that of our enemies, the proximity of the Enghsh coast — all these things combined to make it highly inadvisable for us to become bogged down in a war of long duration. For Time — and it's always Time, you notice — would have been increasingly against us. In order to persuade Britain to pack up, to compel her to make peace, it was essential to rob her of her hope of being able still to confront us, on the Continent itself, with an adversary of a stature equal to our own. We had no choice, we had at all costs to strike the Russian element out of the European balance sheet. We had another reason, equally valid, for our action— the mortal threat that a Russia in being constituted to our existence. For it was absolutely certain that one day or other she would attack us.

Our one and only chance of vanquishing Russia was to take the initiative, for to fight a defensive war against her was not practical. We dared not allow the Red Army the advantage of the terrain, place our Auiobahns at the disposal of its swiftly on-rushing armour, and our railways at the disposal of its troops and its supplies. But if we took the offensive, we could, indeed, defeat the Red Army on its own ground, in the swamps and in the vast and muddy expanses; but in a civUized country we could not have done so. We should simply have been providing it with a spring-board with which to leap upon the whole of Europe and destroy it.

Why 1941? Because, in view of the steadily increasing power of our western enemies, if we were to act at all, we had to do so with the least possible delay. Nor, mind you, was Stalin doing nothing. On two fronts, time was against us. The real question was not, therefore: *Why 22 June 1941 already' but rather: 'Why not earlier still?* But for the difficulties created for us by the Italians and their idiotic campaign in Greece, I should have attacked Russia a few weeks earlier. For us, the main problem was to keep the Russians from moving for as long as possible, and my own personal nightmare was the fear that Stalin might take the initiative before me.

Another reason was that the raw materials which the Russians were withholding were essential to us. In spite of their obligations their rate of delivery decreased steadily, and there was a real danger that they might suddenly cease altogether. If they were not prepared to give us of their own free will the things we had to have, then we had no alternative but to go and take them, in situ and by force. I came to my decision immediately after Molotov's visit to Berlin in November, for it then became clear to me that sooner or later Stalin would abandon us and go over to the enemy. Ought I to have played for time in order that our preparations could have become more complete? No — for by so doing I should have sacrificed the initiative; and again no, because the brief and precarious respite which we might have gained would have cost us very dear. We should have had to submit to the Soviet blackmail with regard to Finland, to Rumania, to Bulgaria and to Turkey. That, of course, was out of the question. The Third Reich, defender and protector of Europe, could not have sacrificed these friendly countries on the altar of Communism. Such behaviour would have been dis-honourable, and Vv'e should have been punished for it. From the moral as well as from the strategic point of view it would have been a miserable gambit. War with Russia had become inevitable, whatever we did; and to postpone it only meant that we should later have to fight under conditions far less favourable.

I therefore decided, as soon as Molotov departed, that I would settle accounts with Russia as soon as fair weather permitted.


17th February 1945

When I pass judgment, objectively and without emotion, on events, I must admit that my unshakeable friendship for Italy and the Duce may well be held to be an error on my part. It is in fact quite obvious that our Italian alliance has been of more service to our enemies than to ourselves. Italian intervention has conferred benefits which are modest in the extreme in comparison with the numerous difficulties to which it has given rise. If, in spite of all our efforts, we fail to win this war, the Itahan alliance will have contributed to our defeat!

The greatest service which Italy could have rendered to us would have been to remain aloof from this conflict. To ensure her abstention, no sacrifices, no presents on our part v/ould have been too great. Had she steadfastly maintained her neutral role, we would have overwhelmed her with our favours. In victory we would have shared with her all the fruits and all the glory. We would have collaborated with all our hearts in the creation of the historic myth of the supremacy of the Italian people, the legitimate sons of the ancient Romans. Indeed, anything would have been preferable to having them as comrades in arms on the field of battle !

Italy's intervention in June 1940, with the sole purpose of aiming a donkey-kick at a French army that was already in process of disintegration, merely had the effect of tarnishing a victory which the vanquished were at the time prepared to accept in a sporting spirit. France recognized that she had been fairly defeated by the armies of the Reich, but she was unwilling to accept defeat at the hands of the Axis.

Our Italian ally has been a source of embarrassment to us everywhere. It was this alliance, for instance, which prevented us from pursuing a revolutionary policy in North Africa. In the nature of things, this territory was becoming an Italian preserve and it was as such that the Duce laid claim to it. Had we been on our own, we could have emancipated the Moslem countries dominated by France; and that would have had enormous repercussions in the Near East, dominated by Britain, and in Egypt* But with our fortunes linked to those of the Italians, the pursuit of such a policy was not possible. All Islam vibrated at the news of our victories. The Egyptians, the Irakis and the whole of the Near East were all ready to rise in revolt. Just think what we could have done to help them, even to incite them, as would have been both our duty and in our own interest ! But the presence of the Italians at our side paralysed us; it created a feeling of malaise among our Islamic friends, who inevitably saw in us accomplices, willing or unwilling, of their oppressors. For the Italians in these parts of the world are more bitterly hated, of course, than either the British or the French. The memories of the barbarous reprisals taken against the Senussi are still vivid. Then again the ridiculous pretensions of the Duce to be regarded as The Sword of Islam evokes the same sneering chuckle now as it did before the war. This title, which is fitting for Mahomed and a great conqueror like Omar, Mussolini caused to be conferred on himself by a few wretched brutes whom he had either bribed or terrorized into doing so. We had a great chance of pursuing a splendid policy with regard to Islam. But we missed the bus, as we missed it on several other occasions, thanks to our loyalty to the Italian alliance!

In this theatre of operations, then, the Italians prevented us from playing our best card, the emancipation of the French subjects and the raising of the standard of revolt in the countries oppressed by the British, Such a policy would have aroused the enthusiasm of the whole of Islam. It is n characteristic of the Moslem world, from the shores of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific, that what affects one, for good or for evil, affects all.

On the moral side, the effects of our policy were doubly disastrous. On the one hand we had wounded, with no advantage to ourselves, the self-esteem of the French, On the other hand this, of itself, compelled us to maintain the domination exercised by the French over their empire, for fear that the contagion might spread to Italian North Africa and that the latter might then also claim its independence. And since all these territories are now occupied by the Anglo-Americans, I am more than justified in saying that this policy of ours was a disaster. Further, this futile policy has allowed those hypocrites, the British, to pose, if you please, as liberators in Syria, in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania !

From the purely military point of view things have not been much better! Italy's entry into the war at once gave our enemies their first victories, a fact which enabled Churchill to revive the courage of his countrymen and which gave hope to all the Anglophiles all the world over. Even while they proved themselves incapable of maintaining their positions in Abyssinia and Cyrenaica, the Italians had the nerve to throw themselves, without seeking our advice and without even giving us previous warning of their intentions, into a pointless campaign in Greece, The shameful defeats which they suffered caused certain of the Balkan States to regard us with scorn and contempt. Here, and nowhere else, are to be found the causes of Yugoslavia's stiffening attitude and her volte-face in the spring of 1941. This compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans, and that in its turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of our attack on Russia. We were compelled to expend some of our best divisions there. And as a net result we were then forced to occupy vast territories in which, but for this stupid show, the presence of any of our troops would have been quite unnecessary. The Balkan States would have been only too pleased, had they been so allowed, to preserve an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards us.

As for our paratroopers I would have preferred to launch them against Gibraltar than against Corinth or Crete! Ah! if only the Italians had remained aloof from this war ! If only they had continued in their state of non-belligerence! In view of the friendship and the common interests that bind us, of what inestimable value to us such an attitude would have been! The Allies themselves would have been delighted, for, although they never held any very high opinion of the martial qualities of Italy, even they never dreamed that she would turn out to be as feeble as she was. They would have considered themselves lucky to see remain neutral such power as they attributed to the Italians. Even so, they could not have afforded to take chances, and they would have been compelled to immobilize considerable forces to meet the danger of an intervention, which was always menacing and v/hich was always possible, if not probable. From our point of view this means that there would have been a considerable number of British troops, immobile and acquiring neither the experience of battle nor the fillip derived from victory — in short, a sort of 'phoney war', and the longer it continued, the greater would be the advantage that we gained from it.

A war that is prolonged is of benefit to a belligerent in that it gives him the opportunities to learn to wage war. I had hoped to conduct this war without giving the enemy the chance of learning anything new in the art of battle. In Poland and Scandinavia, in Holland, Belgium and France I succeeded. Our victories were swift, were achieved with a minimum of casualties on both sides, but were yet suflSciently clear-cut and decisive to lead to the complete defeat of the enemy.

If the war had remained a war conducted by Germany, and not by the Axis, we should have been in a position to attack Russia by 15th May 1941. Doubly strengthened by the fact that our forces had known nothing but decisive and irrefutable victories, we should have been able to conclude the campaign before winter came.

Wc Germans do well to remember that in circumstances such as these it is better for us to play a lone hand. We have everything to lose and nothing to gain by binding ourselves closely with more feeble elements and by choosing into the bargain partners who have given all too frequent proof of their fickleness.


18th February 1945

Japan's entry into the war caused us no misgivings, even though it was obvious that the Japanese had made a present of a cast-iron pretext to Roosevelt for bringing in the United States against us. But Roosevelt, urged on by Jewry, was already quite resolved to go to war and annihilate National Socialism, and he had no need of any pretexts. Such pretexts as were required to overcome the resistance of the isolationists he was quite capable of fabricating for himself. One more little swindle meant nothing to him.

The magnitude of the Pearl Harbour disaster was, I am sure, balm to his soul. It was exactly what he wanted in order to be able to drag his countrymen into a total war and to annihilate the last remnants of opposition in his own country. He had done all in his power to provoke the Japanese, It was only a repetition, on a vaster scale, of the tactics employed with such success by Wilson at the time of the first war : the torpedoing of the Lusitania, provoked with diabolical skill, prepared the Americans psychologically for the entry of their country into the war against Germany. Since the intervention of the United States could not be prevented in 1917, it is obvious that their intervention now, twenty-five years later, was both a logical premise and unavoidable.

It was only in 1915 thai World Jewry decided to place the whole of its resources at the disposal of the Allies. But in our case, Jewry decided as early as 1933, at the very birth of the Third Reich, tacitly to declare war on us. Furthermore the influence wielded by the Jews in the United States has consistently and steadily increased during the last quarter of a century. And since the entry of the United States into the war was quite inevitable, it was a slice of great good fortune for us to have at our side an ally of such great worth as Japan, But it was also a slice of great good fortune for the Jews. It gave them the chance they had so long been seeking to implicate the United States directly in the conflict, and it was a master stroke on their part to have succeeded in dragging the Americans unanimously and enthusiastically into their war. The Americans, mindful of their disillusionment in 1919, were by no means anxious once again to intervene in a Euroixan war.

On the other hand they were more obsessed than ever with the idea of the Yellow Peril. Trying to teach the Jews a trick or two is like carrying coals to Newcastle, and you can be quite sure that all their plans are conceived with Machiavellian astuteness. I myself am quite convinced that in the case we are discussing they took a very long view which envisaged the overthrow by a white Power of the Empire of the Rising Sun, which had risen to the status of a world Power and which had always sternly resisted contamination by the race of Jewry,

For us, Japan will always remain an ally and a friend. This war will teach us to appreciate and respect her more than ever. It will encourage us to draw more tightly the bonds which unite our two countries. It is of course regrettable that the Japanese did not enter the war against Russia and at the same time as ourselves. Had they done so, Stalin's armies would not now be besieging Breslau or squatting in Budapest. We should have liquidated Bolshevism by the time winter came, and Roosevelt would have hesitated to take on adversaries as powerful as our two selves. In the same way I am sorry that Japan did not capture Singapore as early as 1940, immediately after the defeat of France. The United States was then on the eve of a presidential election and would have found it impossible to intervene. That, then, was one of the turning points of the war.


20th February 1945

Taking advantage of the enthusiasm we had aroused in Spain and the shock to which we had subjected Britain, we ought to have attacked Gibraltar in the summer of 1940, immediately after the defeat of France.

At that time, however, the awkward thing was that it would have been difficult to prevent Spain entering into the war on our side — and particularly so as we had failed, a few weeks previously, from preventing Italy from flying to the rescue of our victory.


21st February 1945

The universahsts, the idealists, the Utopians all aim too high. Tiiey give promises of an unattainable paradise, and by doing so they deceive mankind. Whatever label they wear, whether they call themselves Christians, Communists, humanitarians, whether they are merely sincere but stupid or wire-pullers and cynics, they are all makers of slaves. I myself have always kept my eye fixed on a paradise which, in the nature of things, lies well within our reach. I mean an improvement in the lot of the German people.

The National Socialist doctrine, as I have always proclaimed, is not for export. It was conceived for the German people. All the objectives at which it aims are, of necessity, limited—but attainable. It follows, then, that I can put as little credence in the idea of universal peace as in that of universal war.

It was on the eve of Munich that I realized beyond doubt that the enemies of the Third Reich were determined to have our hide at ail costs and that there was no possibility of coming to terms with them. When that arch capitalist bourgeois. Chamberlain, with his deceptive umbrella in his hand, put himself to the trouble of going all the way to the Berghof to discuss matters with that upstart, Hitler, he knew very well that he really intended to wage ruthless war against us. He was quite prepared to tell me anything which he thought might serve to lull my suspicions. His one and only object in undertaking this trip was to gain time. What we ought then to have done was to have struck at once. We ought to have gone to war in 1938. It was the last chance we had of localizing the war.

But they gave way all along the line and, like the poltroons that they are, ceded to all our demands. Under such conditions it was very difficult to seize the initiative and commence hostilities. At Munich we lost a unique opportunity of easily and swiftly winning a war that was in any case inevitable.

Although we were ourselves not fully prepared, we were nevertheless better prepared than the enemy. September 1938 would have been the most favourable date. And what a chance we had to limit the conflict.

We ought then and there to have settled our disputes by force of arms and disregarded the inclination of our opponents to meet all our demands. When we solved the Sudeten question by force we liquidated Czechoslovakia at the same time — and left all the blame squarely on Benes' shoulders. The Munich solution could not have been anything but provisional, for, obviously, we could not tolerate in the heart of Germany an abscess, small though it was, like an independent Czech state. We lanced the abscess in March 1939, but in circumstances that were psychologically less favourable than those which would have obtained had we settled the issue by force in 1938. For in March 1939, for the first time, we put ourselves in the wrong in the eyes of world opinion- No longer were we restricting ourselves to reuniting Germans to the Reich, but were establishing a protectorate over a non-German population.

A war waged in 1938 would have been a swift war — for the emancipation of the Sudeten Germans, the Slovaks, the Hungarians and even of those Poles who were under Czech domination. Great Britain and France taken by surprise and discountenanced by the course of events would have remained passive — particularly in view of the fact that world opinion would have been on our side. Finally, Poland, the main prop of French policy in eastern Europe, would have been at our side. If Great Britain and France had made war on us in these circumstances they would have lost face. In actual fact, I'm quite sure they would not have gone to war; but they would have lost face all the same. Once our arms had spoken, we could have left till later the settlement of the remaining territorial problems in eastern Europe and the Balkans without fear of provoking the intervention of the two Powers, already discredited in the eyes of their proteges. As far as we ourselves were concerned, we should thus have gained the time required to enable us to consolidate our position, and we would have postponed the world war for several years to come. In fact, in these circumstances I doubt very much whether a second world war would, indeed, have been inevitable.

It is by no means unreasonable to presume that in the breasts of the well-found nations degeneration and love of comfort could well have proved stronger than the congenital hatred they bore us— particularly when it is remembered that they must have reaUzed that all our aspirations were, in reality, orientated eastwards. Our adversaries might even have deluded themselves with the hope that we might perhaps exhaust ourselves in the pursuit of these eastern aspirations of ours. In any event, it would, for them, have been a case of heads I win, tails you lose, since it would have ensured for them maintenance of peace in the west, and at the same time would have allowed them to take advantage of the resultant weakening of Russia, whose growing power had been a source of preoccupation for them, though to a lesser degree than had been our own resurgence.


26th February 1945

In actual fact, my decision to settle the issue with Russia by force of arms was taken as soon as I became convinced that Britain was determined to remain stubborn. Churchilt was quite unable to appreciate the sporting spirit of which I had given proof by refraining from creating an irreparable breach between the British and ourselves. We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating them at Dunkirk. We ought to have been able to make them realize that the acceptance by them of the Germaii hegemony established in Europe, a state of affairs to the implementation of which they had always been opposed, but which I had implemented without any trouble, would bring them inestimable advantages.

Even by the end of July, one month, that is, after the defeat of France, I realized that peace was once again eluding our grasp, A few weeks later I knew that we should not succeed in invading Britain before the advent of the autumnal gales because we had not succeeded in acquiring complete command of the air. In other words, I realized that we should never succeed in invading Britain.

The attitude of the Russians during the summer of 1940, the fact that they had absorbed the Baltic States and Bessarabia while we ourselves were busy in the west left me with no illusions regarding their intentions. And even if I had retained any, Molotov's visit in November would have been sufficient to dissipate them. The proposals which Stalin submitted to me after the return of his Minister did not deceive me. Stalin, that incomparable and imperturbable blackmailer, was trying to gain time in order to consolidate his advanced bases in Finland and the Balkans. He was trying to play cat and mouse with us.

The tragedy, from my point of view, was the fact that I could not attack before 15th May, and if I were to succeed in my first initial onslaught, it was essential that I should not attack later than that date, Stalin, however, could have launched his attack much earlier. Throughout the winter of 1940, and even more so in the spring of 1941, I was haunted by the obsession that the Russians might take the offensive. In the event, the Italian defeats in Albania and in Cyrenaica had roused a minor storm of revolt in the Balkans. Indirectly, they also struck a blow at the belief in our invincibility, that was held by friend and foe alike.

This alone was the cause of Yugoslavians volte-face, an event that compelled us to drag the Balkans into the war; and that was something which at all costs I had desired to avoid. For once we had become involved in that direction we might well have been tempted to go still further ahead. I need hardly say that in the spring of 1941 we could rapidly have liberated the Near East with only a small fraction of the forces which we were about to employ against Russia. But to have removed the necessary forces from their place in our order of battle at that juncture would have been to incur the indirect danger of giving Russia a signal to attack. They would have done so in the summer, or at the latest in the autumn, and under conditions so disastrous from our point of view, that we could never have hoped to win the day.

[] Russia could not stand idly aside and watch the destruction of Great Britain, for in that case, with the United States and Japan cancelling each other out, as it were, the Russians would find themselves face to face with us — and alone. And that would mean without any doubt that, at a time and a place of our choice, the long-outstanding issue between us would be settled in our favour.

If I felt compelled to decide to settle my accounts with Bolshevism by force of arms, and, indeed, arrived at my decision on the very anniversary of the signing of the Moscow pact, I have every right to believe that Stalin had come to the same decision even before he signed the pact.


2nd April 1945

With the defeat of the Reich and pending the emergence of the Asiatic, the African and, perhaps, the South American nationalisms, there will remain in tbe world only two Great Powers capable of confronting each other — the United States and Soviet Russia. The laws of both history and geography will compel these two Powers to a trial of strength, either militaiy or in the fields of economics and ideology. These same laws make it inevitable that both Powers should become enemies of Europe. And it is equally certain that both these Powers will sooner or later find it desirable to seek the support of the sole surviving great nation in Europe, the German people. I say with all the emphasis at my command that the Germans must at all costs avoid playing the role of pawn in either camp.

If North America does not succeed in evolving a doctrine less puerile than the one which at present serves as a kind of moral vade mecum and which is based on lofty but chimerical principles and so-called Christian Science, it is questionable whether it will for long remain a predominantly white continent. It will soon become apparent that this giant with the feet of clay has, after its spectacular rise, just sufficient strength left to bring about its own downfall. And what a fine chance this sudden collapse will offer to the yellow races! From the point of view of both justice and history they will have exactly the same arguments (or lack of arguments) to support their invasion of the American continent as had the Europeans in the sixteenth century. Their vast and undernourished masses will confer on them the sole right that history recognizes— the right of starving people to assuage their hunger — provided always that their claim is well backed by force !